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Chapter 9
Global Residents in Urban Networks: 
The Right to Asylum in European 
Cosmopoleis
David Álvarez
Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to examine the limitations of our current 
political structures in incorporating the cosmopolitan principles that may be emerg-
ing in the normative developments of our global order. The perspective that I take is 
explicitly cosmopolitan, although it is elaborated out of an exercise of immanent 
criticism from within our existing institutional order. This analysis confronts spaces 
of the incipient articulation of cosmopolitan realities with political models of inter-
national legitimacy. This scenario constitutes an example of the incapacity of 
national state democracies to give a proper account of their foreign duties through 
national or supranational institutions. We briefly examine two emerging political 
sites that partially realize cosmopolitan realities in defiance of the national system. 
The first case is the political space of our metropoleis and their distinctive disposi-
tion towards refugees in Europe. The second case is the emergence of a cross-border 
network of urban connectivity and the alternative characterization of the refugee 
flows as a constitutive part in this transnational social fabric.
9.1  The Duty of Rescue: From Right, to Favor, to Interest
We can interpret the right to asylum as a cosmopolitan norm on two counts. The first 
and perhaps most common reading is the one that stresses its individual character. 
Asylum is a legal status that is granted to an individual who happens to be in the 
exceptional circumstances where the collective political system where she is recog-
nized as a member cannot or will not protect her basic rights. Therefore, as a vulner-
able individual deprived of a protective political community, she depends on a 
subsidiary polity in which she could be incorporated. In this view, we tend to think 
of states as the primary political entities and asylum seekers as a secondary, deriva-
tive reality. They are similar to particles emitted from some otherwise stable 
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compound. Only in these moments of crisis do humans reveal their vulnerability as 
unassociated elements, as members without membership. Cosmopolitanism is then 
portrayed as a residual circumstance that only emerges when the relevant political 
ties are severed. This view is sociologically and ontologically communitarian, and 
shared history and culture play a constitutive and normative role in it. It understands 
the duty of rescue paired with a duty to assist in restoring the conditions in the com-
munities of origin so individuals can return where they really belong.
The second paradigm interprets the right to asylum in a cosmopolitan key 
because it presupposes that the individual has always been the fundamental unit of 
justification of any political association and that, in some ways, all political com-
munities are tacitly still the product of a daily plebiscite. It is not necessary to sub-
scribe a fictional image of a “natural man” before an ideal social contract or other 
radical atomist view. It is enough to assume that all processes of socialization should 
incorporate the necessary constraints that allow sufficient individualization amidst 
social life. Social conditions should nurture individuals. When these circumstances 
become oppressive for the necessary development of personal freedom and agency, 
they should provide avenues for reform. State recognition implies that other indi-
viduals, through their states, agree on respecting the authority of one territorial sys-
tem because it provides their members with the adequate social conditions to 
exercise their agency. In return, their members reciprocally agree to respect other 
neighboring systems as legitimate forms of exclusion, as well.
Under this view, when a social order violates these constraints we can talk of 
state-collapse, and therefore, individuals find themselves without reasons to keep 
supporting a reciprocal system of jurisdictional recognition unless there is an opera-
tive safety net in place that assumes the responsibility of recreating those basic 
social guarantees elsewhere. If the international order does not live up to its own 
principles, then the legitimacy of its component parts is also undermined. Taken to 
an extreme, this view would even defend that the coercive and exclusionary force 
that polices national borders would also lose its authority; that is, they could not 
claim fully justified grounds to command and demand voluntary compliance. In that 
situation, from a cosmopolitan view, the outsider is right to consider the other side 
of the line as a neighboring society and not as a foreign state (Álvarez 2012).
According to the first interpretation, the conception of cosmopolitanism implicit 
in the right of asylum is of an ethical-humanitarian type, as its normative source 
springs from the collective duty of rescue towards an individual in circumstances of 
vulnerability. It is an ethical patch for the political punctures in an otherwise decent 
system of sovereign states. The second reading, in contrast, is political at its core 
and rests on a fundamental cosmopolitan legitimation of the international system.
These two readings also tend to entice two correlative reactions on the part of the 
rest of the international community. This duality is also captured by the distinction 
between asylum seeker and refugee. As Didier Fassin (2016) crudely remarks, asy-
lum is a condition that occurs in the West, while refugees belong in the global South. 
Asylum is a status conferred to those who are seen as worthy of solidarity among 
Western liberals and who deserve to be treated as one of us. Refugees, in contrast, 
are masses of people subject to pity or compassion, who should be assisted and 
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contained in remote locations where their basic needs can be sufficiently satisfied 
and their claims on our humanitarian duty cancelled.
Fassin also documents a shift in the interpretation of the asylum doctrine, from 
right to favor. This move follows a world in which conflicts become more tightly 
intertwined, and more civilians are affected for longer periods. In contrast, the inter-
national structures to address our shared responsibilities have not kept pace.
The political consequence of this gap is that what was first considered as a robust 
right that was almost routinely granted is now a matter of discretionary policies, 
surrounded with suspicion, ferociously guarded, reluctantly conceded, and politi-
cally magnified.
In response to what they call a broken refugee system and in the face of the chal-
lenges ahead, Alexander Betts and Paul Collier advance a pragmatic proposal of 
reform (2017). In their diagnosis, they identify a priority: the refugees that are most 
in need are those that remain close to the conflict. Rich countries have a strong pref-
erence for keeping them there. However, host countries may have a strategic interest 
in taking advantage of the situation for self-serving interests that donor countries 
would not want to support. For instance, host countries could use the funding not 
only to back their own authoritarian regimes but also to invest in sectors that threaten 
interests in donor countries. For these reasons, the authors affirm that the normative 
aims implied in the right of asylum cannot be met within the current order of sover-
eign states. The only reasonable alternative to advance towards those moral goals is 
to reform the system in a way that aligns the needs of the refugees with the national 
interest of the states involved. The particular proposal that they advance to harmo-
nize all competing interests is to create special economic zones next to resettlement 
areas, where subsidized foreign firms would employ local and refugee labor. This 
way, donors push their firms, host countries attract foreign direct investment, and 
refugees get economic self-sufficiency. From right, to favor, to interest.
Without discussing in detail the problems in this polemic proposal, we will only 
briefly comment on the reasons the authors give to favor resettlement in proximity. 
The main arguments are class and culture. Regarding class, they defend that most of 
the refugees cannot pay the fees to reach richer countries, and once there, they 
would lack the adequate skills for successful social integration. When we talk about 
the refugee crisis, they are the 99%. In contrast, only a small 1% constitutes the 
educated elite who can aspire to resume their lives in more advanced economies, but 
they are not the most vulnerable group. Regarding the cultural argument, the authors 
defend that neighboring countries usually share cultural values, common history, 
and similar languages. Therefore, socialization and employment would be easier for 
the most vulnerable population.
These are plausible reasons. Conceding that Betts and Collier may be right about 
the empirical conditions, I would question nevertheless some reasons in their pro-
posal that I find problematic. In the first place, by resorting to national interest to 
meet the international duty of rescue, Betts and Collier help perpetuate the very 
same problem that they correctly diagnose. We have an international order that is 
incapable of regulating the conditions of an increasingly interdependent world and 
that cannot address these consequences based on shared remedial duties. The 
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 advisable path that the authors offer is to lower the normative bar so that it can con-
verge with a system of national interests that now seems incapable of abiding by its 
own standards of legitimacy.
In this case, the solution implies deferring to the donor country interests’ to keep 
the refugees at bay because otherwise, their generous social conditions would trig-
ger a call effect for a vast unemployable population that would generate a chain of 
onerous social demands that could be used by national populist movements to create 
xenophobic reactions and political instability. Betts and Collier cite Brexit and bor-
der chaos in Europe as a consequence of Merkel’s inability to match ethical calls 
and political realities. Again, without going into much detail in a single example, it 
is worth recalling that many of these unintended consequences are in fact baseless 
perceptions magnified in a public pathos of panic and alarmism.
Even if it is true that Merkel’s “call effect” appealed to many refugees who were 
safe in camps to become economic migrants, it is also true that this distinction is 
becoming particularly blurry if we consider that the standards for sufficient human 
rights protection were not intended to be applied to long-term situations of life on 
hold with dim prospects of improvement. Arjun Appaduray (2004) defined the poor 
as those that have no capacity to aspire. This means that “having nothing to lose” is 
not enough to motivate initiatives when one cannot even conceive of opportunities 
and possibilities ahead. Those who risk their lives are not absolutely desperate. In 
this sense, the authors are right to stress that the European crisis distracted public 
opinion form the real drama of those refugees who were left behind in remote safe 
havens and who cannot even aspire to restart their lives elsewhere. Those who made 
it to Europe had some kind of capital that backed their hopes, be that economic (for 
the trip), human (skills), or social (networks of support and contacts). Those refu-
gees had aspirations for a decent life above mere stagnation in safety. Even the 
surgically analytic philosopher David Miller acknowledged that the refugee crisis 
exceeded the clear-cut categories of his philosophy of immigration and that it 
deserved an explicit epilogue (Miller 2016: 167–168).
Miller’s main worries are now whether a wider asylum policy would incentivize 
brain drain and push back the prospect of reconstructing refugees’ homes in Syria 
and whether a shared-burden system of quotas in Europe is compatible with the 
European open border policy (Miller 2016). Miller’s analysis is consistent with his 
defense of national determination over cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, he 
implicitly conceives those with the opportunity to migrate as some sort of national 
capital. They constitute, as a whole, the human capital of the poorest refugees, even 
if kept in camps as some sort of human savings. Correlatively, Miller defends a 
qualified right to close borders to migrants because this transborder flow would 
undermine the goals of a burden-sharing system of national transfers and compen-
satory financial aid. This consideration follows a national bureaucratic logic that 
represents refugees as proportional national quotas instead of per-capita budget 
allocations that should ideally follow the refugee through her personal journey. It is 
not clear whether Miller’s position on this bureaucratic problem reflects a national-
ist bias in favor of compensating some domestic social fabric for the hosting effort 
or merely accepts the incapacity of the institutions to fully tailor the individual 
funding needs of border-crossing agents.
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In the case of brain drain, there are reasons to think that many refugees would 
prefer to return when safe and possible or that remittances back home would com-
pensate for the opportunity cost of frozen human capital. There are also very good 
reasons to think that our moral priority lies with those left behind and with minimiz-
ing the need to leave. The problem, however, is that the needs of refugees had not 
been an international concern until some of them reached Europe, in part because 
local reactions openly challenged national interest. However, the problem of the 
pragmatic approach of aligning duties with national interest is that such a strategy 
reinforces the nationalist drive, while it downgrades the critical horizon for its nor-
mative assessment. As a consequence, this move prevents the emergence of the new 
institutions necessary for coordinating political action in the face of complex and 
interdependent global threats.
In the following sections, we use the broken refugee system as a case to test the 
limits of two prominent conceptions of the legitimacy of the international system. 
Thomas Christiano (2010) defends a model based on state consent to realize a set of 
morally mandatory international goals. In his view, state consent protects the intrin-
sic value of public equality in democratic decision making (Christiano 2008), while 
democracy is also instrumentally justified for promoting global standards of legiti-
macy such as human rights (2011). Alternatively, Cristina Lafont (2012) reacts to 
the trend to trim down the list of human rights into a core list of state-centered 
urgent concerns by defending a maximalist conception of human rights embedded 
in the global institutional order (2012). Our analysis shows that neither of these 
theoretical frameworks overcomes the problems of national interest and domestic 
bias regarding foreign duties. This temporary conclusion leads to the final part of 
this essay, in which we explore the contribution of European global cities in incor-
porating a cosmopolitan dimension into the global order.
9.2  The Legitimacy of the International Order
9.2.1  State Consent and Global Institutions
Thomas Christiano’s model of democratic authority is a conception for the realiza-
tion of the intrinsic value of public equality in the purchase of political goals and the 
reproduction of a common social world among those who share equal stakes in their 
subjection to a common political authority (Christiano 2008). It is compatible with 
an instrumental justification of democratic authority based on its efficient determi-
nation and the realization of the goals of political life at a domestic level and of a set 
of morally mandatory goals at the international level (Christiano 2010, 2017).
Connecting those levels, Thomas Christiano defends an institutional architecture 
for the international order that derives its political legitimacy from the consent of its 
state members. According to this proposal, there are some fundamental principles 
and institutions that have some proto-constitutional authority and binding force over 
all states. These institutions regulate the most urgent matters for a peaceful 
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 coexistence. Beyond this layer, there is an intermediate level of functional institu-
tions for international cooperation. Their constitution, however, needs only to reflect 
the voluntary agreement of the parties through a process of fair bargaining. Such a 
process of institutional design should express the different contributions of states, 
the functional complementarities of their interests, and a special status conferred to 
the less developed populations.
The strong point in Christiano’s conception is that it is intuitively appealing as an 
idealized model of our international system, which gives it a credible regulative 
force. The idea of a transfer of legitimacy through legitimate consenting parties also 
seems to be a plausible model for institutional incorporation. Unfortunately, this 
model only works if we presuppose that the parties designing the institutions 
through consent are able to establish democratic deliberations among citizens that 
conceive themselves as members of a global order. However, this requirement 
seems difficult to reconcile with our experience of the strong domestic bias in dem-
ocratic deliberations, which seems to be a structural feature of modern democracies. 
The challenge for Christiano’s conception is to provide efficient accountability 
regarding the claims of outsiders while keeping the intrinsic value of democratic 
authority (Álvarez 2017; Christiano 2017).
The problem is that the institutions of public equality represent the common 
social world of those who share equal stakes in its daily reproduction. The institu-
tional continuity of this political community as a stable state is intimately linked to 
the efficiency of such an organization in representing strong membership bonds and 
shared commitments among those included as citizens. Simultaneously, the strength 
of the representation of national co-responsibility overshadows the severity of for-
eign claims and the relevance of external commitments, even if they were once 
endorsed through the authority of state official consent. This is, for instance, the 
case of the Refugee Convention analyzed by Joseph Carens (2013: 215–224). In 
Carens’s view, the problem of resettlement allocation is not one of intellectual dis-
agreement about fairness but merely one of lack of political will, which cannot be 
solved easily by a rearrangement of self-interested incentives because “the gap 
between what morality requires and what serves even long run self-interest is so 
great that interests can do very little to support morality” (Carens 2013: 223).
If we translate this situation into Raz’s conception of authority as service (Raz 
1988: 56), we can conclude that modern democracies suffer from systematic partial 
legitimacy because the system generates perverse and interlocking incentives 
among public authorities and citizens alike to misinterpret the reasons that apply to 
them as members of a collective member of the international system. By following 
biased directives related to foreign responsibilities, citizens contribute to a substan-
tial misallocation of resources, to the habitual undermining of global institutions 
and to the consolidation of an overgrown conception of national interest. This is not 
merely a case of alienation from domestic authority because of lack of identification 
with the laws promulgated. For instance, in Raz’s own example, this would just 
mean the inability to self-identify with the “we” in the sentence “we just changed 
the law to make it more difficult for asylum seekers to stay in the country” (Raz 
2010: 163). However, the case we are examining does not focus on isolated  domestic 
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laws but on the systematic disrespect of domestic authorities for official and binding 
commitments that are recognized as standards of international legitimacy.
Therefore, those citizens that are aware of this systematic unbalance of compet-
ing claims for resources in democratic deliberation may feel trapped in a political 
system that systematically neglects or sabotages the very same standards of legiti-
macy that it endorses.
One possible alternative is to introduce within the domestic political system cor-
rective mechanisms such as courts and constitutional dispositions that counter the 
domestic bias in democratic deliberation. By doing so, standards that were once 
legitimized through the intrinsic value of democratic authority and affirmed through 
state consent are now transformed into external standards of epistemic correctness 
that are applied to validate the outcomes of democratic deliberation. This means that 
democratic authority is being evaluated according to its external performance in an 
instrumental way. When we confront democracies with their systematic underper-
formance regarding severe foreign commitments, we face a dilemma: either we 
defend the intrinsic value of democratic authority and condone its systematic disre-
gard of its own standards of legitimacy, or we defend institutional reforms in politi-
cal deliberation in instrumental terms, according to their capacity to satisfy external 
standards.
In contrast, the introduction of instrumental corrections in domestic institutions 
would tend to limit the intrinsic value of collective self-determination as the realiza-
tion of political equality. Even if these goals and measures had been domestically 
ratified, individuals would feel that they had no effective control of the institutional 
process that leads to their implementation. This second option presupposes that 
political institutions are integrated in a process conducive to the achievement of 
evident and mandatory moral and political goals. Following this line, democracies 
can be justified as the most legitimate political system because they are the most 
effective regime in building the kind of political stability and collective support for 
the achievement of these common and mandatory goals. For instance, we may say 
that the European Union with its hybrid democratic-functionalist logic is an imper-
fect but close implementation of such a model. Its foundational inspiration rests on 
the perception of the intrinsic blind spots of national interest that may lead to peren-
nial conflicts and the inability of the demoi to perceive the self-interested advantages 
of a democratic peace among trading societies and commercial nations. Therefore, 
the functionalist logic builds on the institutional inertia that progressively shapes the 
social environment in which democratic decisions are presented. This scenario may 
be correctly perceived as a democratic deficit form a perspective of the intrinsic 
value of popular sovereignty. However, simultaneously, it can also be defended that 
the model does not only guarantee the convergence around common goals of shared 
prosperity. It also prevents the anti-democratic decisions of a people that, for 
instance, could violate the legitimate interests of other peoples or minorities.
An alternative could consist in making explicit the non-national elements within 
the demos, for instance by amplifying the political input of megacities, as political 
spaces where coexistence is marked by a distinctive ethos of common residence 
among nationals and foreigners alike. We will explore this alternative later.
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9.2.2  Human Rights and Global Institutions
As we argued, when seeking to align international duties of asylum with national 
interests, one of the tempting strategies is to downplay these global demands 
because political representatives will not be held accountable for these duties 
towards foreigners by their national constituencies. As a consequence, we find that 
we have a growing and sophisticated international legal regime that develops inde-
pendently of an also expanding number of philosophically ambitious conceptions of 
human rights but that neither of these norms or doctrines have a substantive effect 
in shaping the practice of states. In contrast, the proliferation of moral constraints, 
goals and shared responsibilities in the international community and international 
organizations had the predictable consequence of devaluing the force of these global 
normative tools.
Facing this precarious state of the art and partially inspired by Rawls’s (1999) 
approach to what is a realistic utopia for the international order, Charles Beitz 
(2009) proposes a practice-dependent understanding of international human rights 
that is political in its nature and functional concerning its content. This means that 
this political conception understands human rights as a normative practice of claims- 
making similar to the one that occurs between courts, lawyers, bureaucrats and 
activists. Additionally, by shifting the focus to the conditions for respecting sover-
eignty among states, this political account does not need to be grounded on a unify-
ing metaphysical doctrine or a philosophical anthropology. It implies that the 
content of human rights in practice should be limited to matters of urgent concern 
that justify the intervention of foreign states. Although this concern does not need to 
be restricted to military interventions, the focus on urgency serves also to justify a 
clearing house approach against other inflationary lists of rights.
This approach could illuminate the schizophrenic state of mind that seems to 
haunt liberal democracies. In the words of Matthey Gibney (2016), it seems difficult 
to otherwise understand how the duty of asylum is at the same time so central to the 
liberal values and so systematically undermined in practice. Such an inconsistency 
leads us to question whether asylum is actually not the norm but a discretionary 
exception. In addition, if we are right, what calls for explanation is its formal nor-
mative subsistence among liberal democratic peoples. Therefore, can asylum still 
count as a human right when states seem so unlikely to act on it? What is a right and 
what is a favor when we exchange claims about asylum?
Although Beitz does not explicitly discuss the topic, the problem of the defini-
tion of the scope of the statute of refugee is a case in point. Proposals vary from the 
more restrictive readings of the Geneva Convention that limit the application to 
victims of persecution, to more expansive interpretations that also include those 
affected by civil war and other conflicts, natural catastrophes, climate or extreme 
poverty and unsustainable social conditions. Some would focus on the type of risk, 
such as when Betts (2015) extends the status to all those under an existential threat 
in their state of origin and forced to flee for their lives as “survival migrants.” Others, 
as Blake (2016) remarks, also consider those who can still make a compelling case 
to flee for better lives. Related discussions can be opened about the rights granted to 
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refugees by the host country: should they have a right to work, to trade, to relocate, 
to citizenship?
In this discussion, the political conception defended by Beitz would aim to delin-
eate the strictly uncontroversial core of a state’s duty of rescue. That is, the clear 
conditions in which a state’s failure to rescue would justify external interference or 
even sanctions. In contrast to this state-centered and minimalistic approach, Cristina 
Lafont (2012) develops an alternative political conception that avoids narrowing the 
scope of international rights protections by giving normative prominence to the 
agential capacities of the international organizations of the global order.
In Lafont’s account, a more extensive list of socio-economic rights should be 
embedded into the official mandate of the institutions of the international order. The 
justification for this maximalist interpretation of the political conception is that the 
institutions of the global order play a substantive role in the ability of sovereign 
states to realize the human rights of their populations. However, it is not always 
clear how we should interpret this human rights mandate, whether as respecting the 
capacity of states to realize these goals by avoiding obstructing policies and inter-
ferences; as protecting vulnerable populations through intervention when these 
interests are threatened by their own state or third parties; or as directly assuming 
responsibility for the implementation of these goals. This is no minor issue for a 
political conception of human rights since its defining characteristic is the identifi-
cation of functional criteria for the attribution of subsidiary responsibilities.
Lafont’s conception of human rights represents an interesting counterpoint to the 
more minimalistic and state-centered views. It is embedded in the overall system of 
international coordination or cooperation and not merely in the official institutions 
of human rights. Lafont’s argumentative strategy is very persuasive because it works 
within the political conception by redirecting its own state-centered arguments into 
a more cosmopolitan outcome. For instance, if you care about the role that the costs 
of external responsibilities play in defining what really counts as a matter of urgent 
international concern (Beitz 2009), then shortening the list of common concerns 
and raising the trigger level represent a flawed approach. This functional interpreta-
tion of human rights fails to take into account the equivalence between security and 
subsistence needs and the role that global institutions may play in enabling domes-
tic socio-economic performance and minimizing exceptional needs of intervention 
(Lafont 2012). In our case, this supports extending full asylum rights to economic 
refugees as well, including the right to work, relocation, social welfare, and the path 
to citizenship.
Additionally, if you are concerned about the imperialist abuse of human rights 
rhetoric to undermine the value of sovereign independence, then you may also focus 
on the role that a strong global order may play in supporting and restoring sover-
eignty against foreign agents and systemic factors (Lafont 2015, 2016). In our case, 
this could support the case for a fairly enforceable global refugee quota system, 
global duties for post-conflict reconstruction, facilitating conditions for a right to 
return, and even a compensation system for brain drain.
The problem with Lafont’s approach is that it does not really take into account 
how political is such a political turn. We can say that this new direction is political 
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because it aims towards a non-comprehensive framework. However, we can also say 
that it is so because it assumes the intrinsic limitation of a system of states. This 
means that even if an argumentation seems compelling in a deliberative framework 
for a non-comprehensive agreement, it does not necessarily translate into the kind 
of reasons that may trigger in domestic institutional settings the adequate response 
of co-responsibility towards outsiders. By shifting the burden of co-responsibility 
and collective coordination to the global order, Lafont also needs to show how these 
same states are able to tame this same domestic bias in the negotiations about global 
institutional design.
The success of this strategy depends on two factors that currently limit the per-
formance of international institutions’ efforts to enhance the legitimacy of the global 
order. On the one hand, the internal legitimacy of these institutions is based ulti-
mately on state consent, and as mentioned previously, the principles of their consti-
tutive mandate tend to reflect a balance of national interests. They therefore have an 
original flaw in their design. On the other hand, even when they officially recognize 
relevant responsibilities that reflect the fundamental standards of the legitimacy of 
the global order, they rarely have the effective capacity to pool the necessary means 
to implement these officially acknowledged duties. State members tend to system-
atically underfund these institutions or fail to mobilize the required resources unless 
they have a converging interest. Even if state parties confer formal legitimation to 
the institutional goals through their explicit consent, they can always rely on the 
domestic implicit consent from their constituencies to maintain this pattern of selec-
tive underperformance. In fact, domestic accountability is generally biased against 
any sacrifice of national interest in favor of foreign parties. The most telling exam-
ple is perhaps the failure of the European Union to overcome the different national 
interests in order to implement a mandatory quota system for the distribution of the 
refugees already in its territory.
Unfortunately, the political turn in human rights does not offer the detailed 
account of a non-statist conception of political practice that a global turn would 
require. In Beitz’s case, this practice is limited to an elite cluster of activists, state 
officials and international bureaucrats. For Lafont’s account to be convincing, it 
must provide a complementary account of civic-cosmopolitan political agency to 
counter the dominant view of national interest. In the following part, we explore the 
role of global cities as emerging political subjects with the capacity to influence 
deliberations in a cosmopolitan way.
9.3  Cosmopolitan Cities
9.3.1  Cityness and Civic Ethos
This exploratory interest in the political landscape of European cities is justified on 
two counts: first, as political entities, cities may represent conceptualizations of 
political problems that differ from the national aggregate; second, urban networks 
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also constitute flows of exchange that transcend the national framework and realize 
a localized experience of the European project. Therefore, cities are cosmopolitan 
realities that provide a contrasting anchor point for political reflection. The expres-
sion of such a distinctiveness occasionally makes explicit a direct confrontation 
with national political lines, leading to policies of strict non-cooperation that are 
similar to the refusal of sanctuary cities to collaborate in the identification of illegal 
immigrants; the explicit development of cities of refuge of a policy of accommoda-
tion of refugees; or the direct implementation of environmental policies or emission 
cuts in line with global policies that the national authority openly neglects or attacks. 
This exploratory proposal does not vindicate the role of cities as a sort of political 
silver bullet for global problems. To be clear, cities can equally be bastions of 
extreme localism or uncompromising not-in-my-backyard policies. The approach 
that guides this exploration is neutral about the content of city politics and more 
focused on its structural capacity to become alternative agoras to the national aggre-
gation of political interest. Consequently, it does not advocate any utopian vision of 
city politics. In contrast, it argues that the political contribution of urbanity rests in 
its condition of localized topos. However, to assess this potential, we first need to 
understand what makes cities distinctive in our global order and how we can give 
adequate expression to their political voice.
Urban settlements shape a distinctive kind of political identity in contrast to the 
national one because it makes explicit the degree to which national commonalities 
are imagined. National identities are generated and reproduced through processes of 
abstraction and socialization through common curricula, media exposure, etc. 
Foreigners are also represented through correlative mechanisms of abstraction and 
stereotypification. Local conflicts, in contrast, are opportunities for testing general 
assumptions about the other in settings where particularities carry a heavier weight 
than generalities. Although national identities are being enacted and reclaimed at 
the local level all over the country, in many cases, the conceptualization in which the 
conflict has been framed would contrast with diverging first-hand experiences, 
exposing mobilized individuals to cognitive dissonances. That would be, for 
instance, the experience of many refugees fleeing from cities torn by civil wars that 
polarized conflicts among neighbors to previously inconceivable levels. From 
Sarajevo to Aleppo, recent memory is full of harmonious mixed populations that 
become existential antagonists when national identities are activated. The argument 
in favor of megalopoleis argues precisely against this artificial homogenization of 
political space. The national imaginary has been instrumental for extending local 
loyalties and solidarities beyond the near and dear. It has worked as a political 
 ideology that carried some degree of universalization through the extension of the 
status of local membership to equal co-nationality. The national cause was also in 
part the result of the preeminence of the landed aristocracy and the rural world over 
the cities. Today’s Europe attests to the contrary, as an example of urban exodus and 
urbanization of the countryside; however, political representation is generally domi-
nated by the image of the territorial nation and the expectative of preferential soli-
darity across the land. Electoral representation tends to mimic this image in the 
distribution of political weight through national districts in a way that balances the 
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demographic hyperdensity of the cities by over-representing unpopulated country 
districts. Even when subnational divisions exist, the abstract modern ideal of politi-
cal equality is territorially adjusted to represent a homogeneous space of national 
sovereignty, an abstract territorial jurisdiction for an imagined community. 
Consequently, nationality takes priority over citizenship as a political identity, 
which translates into the economic and institutional way of integrating the territory. 
The alternative does not consist in substituting national allegiances for local ones. 
In contrast, the proposed alternative consists in avoiding political simplification by 
emphasizing spaces where political life is constituted in a different way. For 
instance, Thomas Christiano’s conception of political equality presupposes that the 
scope of the political community should enclose those who share equal stakes in the 
reproduction of a common social world. It is taken for granted that this level of co- 
responsibility corresponds to the territorial state, which may have a more or less 
centralized structure or be articulated in subnational units. Our working hypothesis, 
however, is that metropolitan politics constitutes a qualitative discontinuity in the 
political landscape that is not reducible to other federal articulations of political 
representation. For instance, the distinctive conditions of hyperdiversity and hyper-
density require a different set of political virtues, dispositions and capabilities. They 
are fit for living in megalopoleis, which are lands of strangers that would not meet 
the communitarian expectation of more traditionalist communities  (Amin 2012; 
Amin and Thrift 2017). This concrete experience of coping with diversity does not 
always translate in a differentiated political influence in a world of states.
Paradoxically, despite their lack of cosmopolitan input, global cities have also 
become global sites that challenge the capabilities of modern states to plan and 
control transborder flows. Globalization, according to Sassen (2006), consists in a 
new articulation of territory, authority, and rights. Its most characteristic manifesta-
tion is the denationalization of the economy, which takes eminent place in cities. 
Some cities emerge as crucial hubs with the capacity to command and control the 
flows in vast and dense transnational networks. Other authors, such as Neil Brenner 
(2013), downplay this capacity, arguing that city centers operate merely as switch 
mechanisms, opening and shutting flows in the network but lacking further decision 
power about the content of the programs. While Sassen’s work is a pioneer in the 
study of the liminal zone in which the city extends its colonizing capacity over non- 
urban areas, Brenner’s analysis tends to resist the spatial identification of the urban 
society with the geographical unit of the city. For Brenner, the city is indissociable 
from modern capitalism, which is a social organization that has reached a planetary 
scale. Therefore, for Brenner, the urban condition, to different degrees, is the 
 dominant way of life (Brenner and Schmid 2015). The two approaches share a good 
deal of common ground, differing in matters of degree and emphasis.
Sassen (2014), for instance, also recognizes the severe and disruptive effects that 
urban growth imposes on peripheral regions that are depleted as mere suppliers of 
resources and infrastructures of communication. Brenner puts the emphasis on the 
transformations that hyperconnectivity imposes on the sites colonized by the mate-
rial and logistic demands of global capitalism and insists on this prism as the privi-
leged lenses to understand the global urban condition (Brenner 2013; Brenner and 
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Schmid 2015). Sassen’s analysis, although it depicts global cities as centers of 
power, also insists on how the transnational and privatizing dynamics of global 
capitalism are creating zones of exclusion and marginalization in our cities while 
depriving residents of real power to shape their lives. In a metaphorical way, for 
Sassen, cities have a voice (2013). They can talk as integrated networks of infra-
structure and population through their break-outs, collapses, and failures. She sug-
gests reading these events as acts of resistance that point to planning defects. 
Sometimes, these issues are voiced by segments of the population as explicit politi-
cal claims. Other times, they are expressed through the pragmatics of dysfunctional 
repurposing or temporary adaptations of urban resources to different uses. Housing, 
accommodation and integration are urban demands that put existing infrastructure 
to a pressing test. They also require creative dispositions on the part of new and old 
neighbors. Sassen calls “cityness” the capacity of urban spaces to “talk back” as an 
open system for interaction, enabling, for instance, the creation of public spaces 
according to need and independently of preconceived planning ideals. Cityness as a 
concept aims to capture an urban virtue of the built environment that is different 
from the heavy Western connotations of “urbanity.” In turn, cityness aims to broaden 
the view to all those realizations of public spatialization that are neglected by our 
cultural expectation of the Western ideal of the city. In this sense, by incorporating 
a receptive disposition to other ways to interact with different forms of the city, city-
ness opens up a truly cosmopolitan view (Sassen 2005).
Urban politics differs from other levels of articulation of political discussion 
because it tends to be more immediately constrained by pragmatic and infrastruc-
tural demands. Unlike abstract constitutional debates about doctrinal interpretation, 
urban politics demands a spatial determination of the political. Although ideas and 
beliefs do play a role in city politics, conflicts are also activated and deactivated at 
more pragmatic levels. Therefore, in city life, individuals are taken in their full 
agential dimension and not reduced to just believers or supporters.
This spatial imperative does not need to be interpreted as a strong structural 
determination, although that was the underlining radical assumption in Henri 
Lefebvre’s seminal formulation of a right to the city. For Lefebvre, this ideal was in 
line with claiming direct participation in the management and production of urban 
space, which is a way to frame human emancipation as an urban revolution in the 
age of planetary urbanization (Lefebvre 2003, 2012; Purcell 2013). Following the 
path opened by Lefebvre’s radical conception of the right to the city, other authors 
(Harvey, Brenner, Soja, Purcell) adopted this formulation for political analyses that 
include the spatial conditions of human habitat without giving it the strong causal 
determination that it has in Lefebvre’s work. In general, they tend to differentiate 
Lefebvre’s use of the right to the city from the more common dilution of the term by 
social movements, coalitions and charters as rights in the city. For instance, David 
Harvey (2013: 25) incorporates the geographical description of the reproduction of 
spatial injustice under capitalism and the right to the city as a limited political tool 
of resistance to mitigate its effects. In a similar way, Neil Brenner advises against 
the potentially adverse effects when demands about local rights to “quality of life” 
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for some constituencies imply costs for other populations of a planetary urbaniza-
tion (Brenner 2013: 176–7).
In relation to the political agency of city users, Edward Soja (2010) follows the 
demands of urban collectives and conceptualizes new categories of spatial injustice 
by interpreting the constitutional principle of non-discrimination in a way that justi-
fies a criterion of compensatory priority in urban planning (Soja 2010: xiv–xvi). 
Susan Fainstein (2010) follows a more normative direction, arguing that even if 
urban politics is strongly contextual, urban planners can develop sufficient basis for 
judgment for a conception of the just city that combines equity in access, participa-
tory democracy, and residential diversity.
In a partly similar way, Leonie Sandercock (2003) develops an ideal of cosmopo-
lis that adopts the language of the right to the city for problems of integration in 
post-colonial metropoleis. Her project combines normative, symbolic and emo-
tional analyses in the study of the resistance of hyper-diverse communities to inte-
gration. It starts by questioning the arguments behind strict demands of integration 
directed to populations coming from former colonial territories or to native indige-
nous peoples expelled by metropolitan settlers. Consequently, she defends a norma-
tive model of urban citizenship that recreates the claims of the right to the city 
through the specific lenses of cultural difference at the level of everyday experience 
of the built environment to promote a subjective sense of belonging (Sandercock 
2003: 150–151). This goal is facilitated by a duty of accommodation that should be 
considered part of the imperial legacy of metropolitan powers. Under this light, 
urban policy should not only consider the rational arguments of the right to the city 
but also anticipate emotional reactions of fear, distrust and rejection and plan in 
advance public spaces to counter such effects. These spaces are part of the commons 
around which public discussion and disagreement should be expected to emerge. It 
is important to remember that even if the commons are a focal point for reconstruct-
ing urban life, civic participation should not be interpreted in a communitarian key. 
For instance, Ash Amin (2012) denounces the regressive effects of the recent recom-
mendation of politics of care, social cohesion and a civic ethos of reconciliation in 
urban planning (Amin 2012: 33–34). Amin warns against this misguided reliance on 
amplified affections that are not accompanied by the adequate institutions for work-
place collaboration, shared innovative learning, and engagement with the commons. 
One of the side effects of the direct emphasis on overcoming differences through a 
communitarian approach to inclusion and social ties is that the marks of unassimi-
lated strangers tend to mutate and persist through shared institutions under a com-
munitarian language that masks xenophobic and discriminatory outcomes. 
Therefore, realistic urban politics should be based on respectful distance, principled 
disagreement, and common life (Amin 2012: 3–7).
This quasi-agonistic spirit is ubiquitous in the direct character in which local 
conflicts are depicted, in part also as a vindication of civic vitality – for instance, in 
Sennett’s pioneering The uses of diversity (1970). However, it would be equivocal 
to assimilate the conflictual element at the base of the regulation of hyperdiversity 
with a defense of a politics of agonist hegemony. At this point, our exploration of 
cosmopolitan cities reaches a substantial problem. So far, the chapter has defended 
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that giving stronger political influence to cities could have a countervailing effect 
against national interest for the realization of the shared duties of rescue and asylum 
in the global order. This was suggested because cities tend to generate a distinctive 
cosmopolitan ethos. However, how could we politically articulate this distinctive 
voice of agonistic hyperdiversity?
9.4  The Scale of Agonistic Populism
The particularity of urban politics is generated by the specific constraints of its ago-
nistic space. These are traditionally limited to an ethos of coexistence and coopera-
tion, but to promote the role of cities as political subjects, we need a political 
language capable to articulate these agonistic demands as a political force beyond 
the local level.
This chapter argues that, despite its merits, the conception of hegemonic popu-
lism and agonistic pluralism developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe can-
not play this function for the articulation of a countervailing cosmopolitan influence. 
The reason is that this agonistic populism relies on the articulation of demands in a 
symbolic language that cannot integrate both the distinctiveness of the different 
urban agoras and an overarching symbolic articulation.
Hegemonic politics has a problem of scale. It cannot keep the motivating force 
of its rhetorical articulation of demands in the same symbolic key at the local and 
supralocal levels. If it succeeded, it would duplicate the hegemonic symbolic con-
struction of the national as an imagined community and, therefore, the familiar 
problems of national interests. If it failed, it would accentuate the antagonistic strug-
gle among local hegemonic identities (Papanastasiou 2017). The populist project is, 
after all, a political task of constructing a singular people through the demarcation 
of an antagonistic social fracture. This people is a singular political subject con-
structed through the articulation of heterogeneous social demands through a chain 
of equivalences into a hegemonic symbolic construction. This incremental dynamic 
of incorporation of new demands is a process of breaking and making. The emer-
gence of the new hegemonic formation presupposes the breaking with the previous 
symbolic order and the replacing of its former articulating reference. Hence, even if 
social heterogeneity is a precondition for the construction of a people, this construc-
tive process is one of symbolic unification. Therefore, it cannot allow for the subsis-
tence of rival symbolic orders within the people that do not converge with the 
hegemonic order. Under these conditions, the distinctiveness of every city would be 
eventually subsumed under a larger symbolic identity. This is why populism has a 
problem of scale. There is no guarantee that a symbolic order that is receptive to the 
agonistic politics of local residence could be incorporated in a hegemonic discourse 
of peoplehood without suppressing the critical edge of agonistic local residence. 
However, it is the distinctiveness of this local dimension that we want to preserve 
and promote as a counter-hegemonic power against the driving dynamics of national 
interest.
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For instance, (Chantal Mouffe 2017; Mouffe and Miesse 2012)  advocates the 
concrete urban conditions as privileged scenarios for the materialization of non- 
rational forms of communication through artistic interventions in the public space. 
The purpose of these new symbolic expressions is to subvert the semiotics of the 
dominant order by making explicit a political fracture around which to create a new 
hegemonic force. However, if this intervention were effective in capturing the speci-
ficity of local demands, then it would lack the potential for context transcending 
mobilization. On the other hand, if this symbolic intervention resonates with hege-
monic force beyond the city walls, it is probably because the local agora has been 
colonized and assimilated as a subsidiary stage for a larger popular subject.
In a similar example, Laclau (2005) illustrates the assemblage of chains of equiv-
alence of social demands with the case of newcomers, immigrants and potentially 
refugees to the city’s outskirts and their progressive claims for housing conditions 
that resonate with related demands for public services and infrastructures of other 
neighbors (Laclau 2005: 72–74). In practice, however, most of these movements 
that frame their demands in the language of the right to the city fail to merge into a 
unified political subject. In contrast, their strength rests in their local specificity, and 
they tend to organize in pragmatic coalitions and alliances. They resist the dilution 
of their political capital into a new people (Nicholls 2008; Purcell 2009). Even if 
they organize into larger scales, connecting local struggles with networks of solidar-
ity in global justice, their strength remains local, in what Soja (2010: 154–155) calls 
“community-based regionalism.”
For this reason, Mouffe’s endorsement and adoption of Massimo Cacciari’s pro-
posal for a multilevel organization of the European Union with multiple sites for 
alternative allegiances resembles a landscape after a lost populist battle more than a 
truly populist project for Europe (Mouffe 2013: 50–54). In agonist-populist terms, 
conflicts through different political scales are temporary struggles for symbolic 
integration of demands into larger chains of equivalence. The agonist-populist proj-
ect is better characterized as a theoretical account of hegemonic political mobiliza-
tion than as an institutional blueprint for a social order. Populism is a movement that 
is defined by shifting borders in an intrinsically antagonistic dynamic. Therefore, it 
cannot prescribe what particular constellation of multilevel resisting sites of alle-
giance and symbolic identification articulates the most inclusive emancipatory 
potential for a demos that is also accountable for its global co-responsibility towards 
outsiders. Advancing such a proposal would amount to taking this balance of 
counter- hegemonic sites as fixed positions. Democratic populism provides the 
 conceptual tools to subvert a hegemonic order, but it lacks the theoretical resources 
to defend a positive project of institutional design.
Mouffe’s project of antagonistic agonism claims to be explicitly receptive to the 
question of scale and mode in her affirmation that there is no privileged space for 
the political (Mouffe and Miesse 2012: 25–26) and in her support of a conception of 
global multipolarity (2013: 19–42). However, there are two main constraints for 
local agoras that are especially relevant for the incorporation of refugee-related 
demands into the political agenda and that seem problematic for the populist 
articulation.
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First, the condition of hyperdensity translates into a situation of unavoidable 
interaction in urban politics. Acknowledging this constraint requires an extra cau-
tion against the inflammatory potential of the antagonistic dynamic of populism, 
with special consideration to the vulnerable situation of minorities and new resi-
dents. Agonistic democrats are aware that galvanizing struggles into a common 
cause would always imply exclusions that may converge around minority scape-
goats, framings of fifth-columnism, and other strategies of xenophobic populism. 
This risk is especially serious when direct interaction is mediated by a construction 
of the other that neglects the inconvenient particularities that do not fit with its func-
tional role as antagonistic other and when the potential for violent action is real.
Second, the condition of hyperdiversity implies the paradoxical fact that the 
common ground for the institutions that sustain the basic principles of the ethico- 
political space, in which antagonistic agonism can occur without degenerating into 
violent confrontations, is thinner at the local than at the national levels.
Mouffe admits that creating union would depend on forging some thin conflictual 
consensus, consisting merely in the acknowledgment that “we are working together 
towards a common aim” (Mouffe and Miesse 2012: 18). In Mouffe’s terms, the legiti-
macy of a dissociative agonism that depends on locating cohesive fractures that iso-
late political opponents rests on the wider inclusivity of an associative agonism that 
legitimates the basic institutions of the common space (Mouffe and Miesse 2012: 24).
However, it is in the local agora where we experience the encounter with the 
stranger. Appropriate interaction at this scale demands a set of virtues and disposi-
tions that are recreated literally at every corner (toleration, charitable interpretation, 
civility, translation, accommodation, etc.). This set of urban virtues is instrumental 
for the maintenance of the more general principles that legitimate the institutions of 
agonism. However, because the local is also the context of the community of strang-
ers, the ethico-political principles shared by the community of residents may be 
thinner than the imagined construction of the national community of citizens. In the 
language of populist agonism, this means that the “empty signifiers” for the sym-
bolic aggregation at the local level may be emptier and thinner than at the national 
level of abstraction of shared citizenship.
These unresolved tensions cast some doubts on the potential of agonistic popu-
lism to become a paradigm for the articulation of the urban space as a counter- 
hegemonic force against the perverse influence of national interest regarding foreign 
duties.
In contrast, the view here presented defends that questions of scale and space are 
relevant for their political potential to create conflict between institutional levels and 
consequently to expose the blindspots in the hegemonic national view – in our case, 
the systematic negligence regarding cosmopolitan responsibilities. Therefore, the 
reason for reclaiming the megalopolitical space is not to substitute or replicate hege-
monic discourses but to challenge them. What we vindicate is a distinctive political 
experience that has the potential to contrast with and challenge the domestic bias in 
the political deliberation at the national level. Additionally, by asserting the intrinsic 
and irreducible value of this local political space, we also justify its functional and 
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instrumental value in the legitimation of the national and European polity regarding 
the fulfillment of international duties.
9.5  Localized Cosmopoleis
There is another way in which scale matters. When adapting cosmopolitan norms to 
the context of the local, we are recreating them in the conditions of civic realization, 
and these conditions tend to differ in tone and substance from their abstract formu-
lation at the national level. Therefore, megalopolitics can also be defended as a case 
of democratic iterations, in the sense coined by Seyla Benhabib (2006) of progres-
sive realization of the cosmopolis through the diffusion of universal principles in 
international norms by means of trans-national legal contagion (e.g., harmonization, 
adaptation, replication, accommodation). Benhabib illustrates the immanent dimen-
sion of this critical cosmopolitanism with a variety of cases in which this ius- 
generative potential is realized through different jurisdictional levels of the EU 
(2004: 202–212). The distinctive take in our view shares the general conception of 
democratic iterations but makes explicit and substantiates the intrinsic ius- generative 
conditions of the urban scale.
The consequence of the normative creativity of the urban is that it is confronted 
with the daily adaptation of the politics of the urban commons to the claims of any-
one who qualifies as a resident or commoner. The category of resident is a more 
universalist category of membership than national citizenship. It captures in a more 
emphatic way that actors are embedded and incardinated in  localized social net-
works. Hence, residency can be read as a local determination of the cosmopolitan 
condition. In this fundamental sense, we are all global residents, and ideally, this is 
a condition that all democratic states should recognize for all their nationals as a 
legitimate channel for expressing fundamental alienation from state policy. Global 
residency would be therefore a default status for those exercising a right of exit 
within the state by renouncing their national citizenship and opting for realizing 
their political dimension at the local level (Álvarez 2016). Similarly, as global resi-
dents, refugees qualify as involuntary victims of a dysfunctional state.
This alternative approach to the cosmopolitan dimension of urban politics also 
differs from the populist articulation of social demands in that the voices of the new 
residents are not diluted into an overarching populist discourse. In contrast, they 
remain differentiated as reminders of the situation of those who were left behind. 
This irreducibility is part of the corrective cosmopolitan input from urban areas. The 
refugee crisis may also be portrayed as an extreme form of a politics of presence 
because even if only the fortunate 1% of refugees are resourceful enough to aspire 
to some level of integration in Western societies, their presence is one of the few 
ways that the other 99% have to make an entry into our domestic agendas. In this 
sense, we can think of them as the most articulate and undiplomatic ambassadors of 
our foreign global neighbors.
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The cosmopolitan agential condition here is critical because it goes beyond the 
right of asylum understood as a right to have rights, as a universal protection of 
political membership. This brilliant Arendtian formulation, productively developed 
by Seyla Benhabib, is occasionally read in a minimalistic key that assimilates the 
right of asylum to some basic conditions of hospitality. In contrast, the interpreta-
tion that this chapter defends is in line with the cosmopolitan notion of default 
global residence after state collapse. In particular, it develops the fundamental 
meaning of the right to have rights as the reconstruction of “a place in the world 
which makes opinions significant and actions effective” (Arendt 1973: 296). It is 
also important to emphasize the second part of Arendt’s formulation, where she 
specifies that this means having a place where one is judged according to one’s 
words and deeds (Arendt 1973: 296–297), that is, according to one’s contributions 
as an individual and not merely as a part of a collective in need of humanitarian 
protection and assistance. Consequently, the proper cosmopolitan response to valid 
claims for residence is not only to provide resources but also to transform the built 
environment that we share so that it translates the contributions and interactions of 
newcomers into meaningful actions. This more detailed reading developed by 
Benhabib (2013) differs from the political turn sponsored by Beitz in that Benhabib 
makes explicit the moral core of intersubjective recognition, while Beitz (2013) nar-
rows the focus to the practice of exchanging claims for urgent concern. While Beitz 
discusses how long a minimal list of rights for decent self-governing societies 
should be, Benhabib focuses instead on the conditions that validate the claims of 
others to rights. The local scale is a privileged setting for situating the self in the 
ethical thickness of concrete others that always remain as neighboring strangers. In 
this sense, in the urban agora, we reconstruct each other as subjects of specific 
rights. This applies, for instance, to the claims over urban commons, of meaningful 
agency, of opportunities for self-sufficient economic activity, of transborder mobil-
ity, and of reunion and affiliation in hosting networks.
The need to protect refugees’ capacity for agency is also highlighted in Fassin’s 
anthropological observations (Fassin 2012, 2016) and in Brett and Collier’s pro-
posal (2017). However, what the latter describe as the conditions for autonomy 
should be understood not in the moral sense but as economic self-sufficiency. Both 
meanings are nevertheless connected in the sense that life in the camps in situations 
of total dependency – with life on hold for decades, in many cases – puts to the test 
the sense of dignity and self-respect. All this is aggravated by the need of the indi-
viduals trapped in these circumstances to portray themselves as a living image of 
ultimate victimhood and destitution in order to appeal to foreign donors.
While the capacity to realize significant choices encapsulates the paradigmatic 
liberal conception of individual autonomy, the image of the refugee as a collective 
captures the liberal notion of charitable dependency. Fassin (2016) reminded us that 
the fate of the refugees was marked by an international devaluation of their status, 
from right to favor. Brett and Collier (2017) go one step further by conditioning 
refuge to national interest. By granting labor permits and market licenses to refu-
gees in cities, camps and factories, the authors want to make the case for self- 
sufficiency as an individual need while also minimizing the cost of the correlative 
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international responsibility. Although this second, pragmatic argument is question-
able, the first defense of the right to economic activity converges with the right to be 
given proper consideration as an independent public persona and with the role that 
Ash Amin (2012: 35–58) confers to co-working as a source of social trust in the 
megalopolis.
A related consequence of the respect for the agential dimension of refugees is 
that hosting cities should facilitate the creation of social networks of support and 
interdependency through which the new residents may become significant partici-
pants and contributors. The capacity to reconstruct basic social fabric depends on 
associative efforts and the consolidation of a critical mass of potential interlocutors. 
It depends on shared social capital, linguistic skills for translation and personal 
communication, microeconomics of scale for sharing expenses, etc. These networks 
of support are the cumulative product of shared learning experiences and the mobi-
lization of individuals searching for the optimal match. These networks often con-
nect several cities through informal flows between communities, and they may even 
cross national borders. These transnational networks constitute part of the infra-
structure of our urban era, and they are also of vital importance to determine how 
newcomers find a significant place and voice in the urban agora. The case of the 
European refugee flow is therefore an example of a transnational dynamic, gener-
ated by the complementary capacities of urban actors, which exceeds the national 
mind frame of the territorial state. Allowing refugees a sufficient degree of agency 
in the co-determination of their residence constitutes a challenge for the traditional 
attribute of state sovereignty of the capacity to control flows through the territory 
and is therefore an emerging point for friction and compromise. It is also an impor-
tant realization of what the European project is. As we have argued so far, we cannot 
understand the city in isolation from its networks of flows and infrastructures. The 
European political project is also a metapolis of extended urban fabric that goes 
beyond national borders (Ascher 1995, 2009). This means that we need to under-
stand ourselves as constituted by these flows of transnational communication that 
are an integral constituent of our shared political ideal.
9.6  Conclusions
From right, to favor, to empty promise. The tragedy of the refugee crises is a telling 
illustration that shows the unreliability of democratic societies to abide by their 
cosmopolitan duties and foreign commitments when they are insulated from elec-
toral sanction and serious accountability (Christiano 2008, 2010, 2011, 2017). The 
alternatives may be to deflate the normative horizon so that it captures the realisti-
cally utopian limits of the morality of states; to better align international moral goals 
with national interests; or to transcend the limitation of a state-centered order by 
embedding our normative goals in global agencies with an explicit moral mandate 
(Lafont 2012, 2015, 2016).
Our examination of the refugee crises illustrates the difficulties of Christiano’s 
conception of state consent and of Lafont’s global regime of human rights to over-
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come this structural limitation. This chapter argues that the emergent global cities 
are non-national polities with the capacity to influence political deliberations in a 
more cosmopolitan direction. This is so because our megalopoleis are sites that real-
ize a differentiated cosmopolitan ethos and because the human flows that connect 
them are also constitutive realities of a deeply interdependent political order (meta-
polis). The mismatch between national and metropolitan interests in the European 
Union is a case in point that needs to be given a political voice.
Finally, although agonistic populism constitutes an influential conception for the 
articulation of social demands, it does not provide an alternative to the domestic 
bias implicit in the idea of national interest. We argued that urban politics may 
become potential sites for contesting this national bias. However, agonistic popu-
lism lacks the political resources for the expression of such a counter-hegemonic 
force because it tends to override the specificities of the scale of the local agora in 
favor of an overarching conception of the people. In contrast, this chapter defends a 
cosmopolitan approach in the line of Benhabib’s conception of democratic iteration. 
It argues that questions of scale are intrinsically ius-generative and that our megalo-
poleis should reflect this feature by incorporating refugees and emphasizing our 
common condition of residents in the cosmopoleis of Europe.
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